Dien Bien Phu & the Last Empire

Dien Bien Phu & the Last Empire

by J.M. Hamilton (Originally Published 12-25-11)

“Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy.” – French P.M. Jules Ferry

Lost in the fog of war and the mists of time is a long forgotten battle. A battle fought on the other side of the world, between the French and a proud and indigenous people, who wanted nothing more than their freedom from colonial rule. The U.S., at that time, pumped what would be considered an exceptional amount of money into the French military. Fought in the decade following WWII, and with the Korean War very much on the minds of U.S. policy makers, surely the French could defeat this revolutionary tribe. But it was not meant to be, the French decided to roll the dice within Indochina’s isolated hill country, near the enemy’s Laotian supply line. The French opposition knew the importance of this battle, as international negotiations were underway in Geneva over the regions future. The French, who had brought with them into battle mobile bordellos, were caught off guard when they found themselves surrounded by captured artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns, strategically placed on higher ground. The subsequent battle of Dien Bien Phu ended French colonial rule in Southeast Asia, and became a rallying cry globally for nationalist movements seeking independence from occupying western powers. The country was subsequently divided in two at Geneva, and Ho Chi Minh was given a foothold in North Vietnam and international legitimacy, with which to launch a civil war that would eventually end in American defeat two decades later.

The New York Times reported on 5-9-54 the following: “The fall of Dien Bien Phu marks the end of an era. The ultimate military, political and psychological reactions may either make or break the anti-Communist front in the Far East and France as a great power… A lost battle has tipped the scales of history in the past; Dien Bien Phu may prove, in future accountings, to be the balance point in contemporary history.” - After Dien Bien Phu, What?

Could the Iraq war be America’s Dien Bien Phu?

Before answering that question, let’s take a look at the similarities and differences between America’s wars in Iraq and Indochina. And then let’s examine the cost allocation of war.

History repeats. Both wars, Vietnam and Iraq, were started at a time when the American public was hyper vigilant about a perceived and real menace in the world: Communism and Radical Islam. In both wars, political authorization for U.S. involvement was obtained under dubious and questionable circumstances: In Vietnam it was the Gulf of Tonkin incident that provided a catalyst, and in Iraq it was concern over weapons of mass destruction. In both wars the political goals and objectives were nebulous over time, and finally denigrated into “nation building;” and in both wars, America was either forced to leave the battlefield or requested to leave… no longer wanted, and leaving under less than auspicious circumstances. Time would also show that the twin threats of Communism and Arab Radicalism would dissolve considerably with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Arab Spring/pro-democracy movements.

And as Vietnam proved, and as pointed out by Alan Abelson in last weeks Barron’s, Americans will not know the true cost of the Iraq war for many decades. The Iraq war will more than likely exceed a trillion is net cost, but that doesn’t begin to account for the tremendous forgone opportunity costs incurred by the nation, when we consider that Iraq war debt could have been allocated to helping Americans achieve a higher education, or if said funds were allocated to paying down the national debt, or not expanding same. Even by today’s standards, a trillion dollars is still real money. Nor does this begin to factor in the additional economic burden placed upon ordinary Americans, and returning soldiers, post war, when monetary policy inevitably swings towards war debt monetization – resulting in inflation and lower living standards.

That the real political achievement of the Iraq war was the permanent removal of Saddam Hussein calls into question the efficacy of Executive Order 12333, which supposedly forbids the assassination of foreign heads of state. The reality is there are plenty of exemptions to Executive Order 12333, and so if we compare the cost of the Iraq war to say, the cost of the mission to eliminate Osama bin Laden, well there really is no comparison. What’s the nominal cost of a bullet or a drone, versus the extraordinary cost of Iraq War…. all to remove one man? To push the point a step further, compare the cost, in blood and treasure, to remove Col. Gaddafi versus Saddam Hussein?

Separately, “nation building” (code for we no longer know what the freak we are doing here, so we have turned this mission into a philanthropic enterprise) was a failure in Vietnam, and only time will tell if it will prove successful in Iraq. Recent actions by the Iraqi prime minister, like issuing an arrest warrant for the Iraqi Vice President and further consolidating his hold on power, already call into question whether or not a nascent Iraqi democracy will flower and grow. What nation building really has come to symbolize is a run up of conflict costs and expenditures, and a financial “pig-out” by private contractors and commercial interests within a war zone, all at U.S. tax payer expense.

Despite many similarities, a key difference between both wars was the utilization of conscription by U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam, versus an all volunteer military fighting force in the Iraq War, and the resulting passive objection to the Iraq war by U.S. society, versus the near public rebellion over the Vietnam war. Some how it makes it more acceptable to some Americans if the poor and the down trodden are voluntarily sacrificed upon the altar of war, instead of the sons and daughters of the wealthy and the middle class, via the draft. And the military industrial complex (MIC) knows this. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of a separation in society between an elite warrior class and ordinary Americans.

Also of critical importance, we can see a tremendous disconnect in the way the costs of war are passed onto society as whole, in lieu of armed conflict’s true beneficiaries. J.M.H. argues that because of this, wars have a tendency to drag on indefinitely. In other words if the true costs of the war were allocated correctly, than wars would become more efficient, cost effective, produce swifter results with less loss of human life, and pull out and withdrawal would become more rapid. More thought might also be given to entering into war in the first place.

So who or what truly benefited then from the removal of Saddam Hussein, aside from the Shia majority inside Iraq? Well as clearly alluded to by French Prime Minister Jules Ferry, commercial interests clearly benefit from war without end, colonization, and/or nation building. Big Oil was clearly chomping at the bit to return to Iraq. And of course the U.S. military industrial complex expanded and grew, significantly, over the last decade, more than doubling in budgetary outlays. Not surprisingly banks benefit with the issuance of martial debt and financing. The fact that the U.S. government spends more on defense than the G-20 combined says it all.

As with all wars, there are often unintended consequences. An unintended beneficiary of Mr. Hussein’s removal was Iran; and Iran has been working to obtain a foothold inside Iraq, with success, ever since the U.S. lead invasion.

America has to figure out a way to be less subservient to what President Eisenhower referred to in his farewell address to the nation as the military industrial complex; failure to do so may mean that Iraq could become America’s Dien Bien Phu. How then might America control the costs of war, and prevent taxpayer money, sometimes with good intentions, from being wasted on nation building? If the cost of Iraq war was amortized over the costs of the products and services produced by the MIC, and passed onto foreign consumers (America being the largest arms dealer on the planet), the price of a prolonged and protracted war would become too great for the MIC to endure and would make MIC products and services considerably less competitive. Likewise, if the price of the Iraq war were presented as a cost of doing business to Big Oil or mining interests, they would balk at the cost; and maybe the Iraq war truly would have ended when Mr. George Bush landed on the deck of the aircraft carrier, USS Abraham Lincoln, with the now infamous sign, “Mission Accomplished.” Thanks to the manner in which American wars are presently billed, there is no financial incentive to rein in the cost, since the U.S. has been living on a credit card economy for decades, and the MIC, via its all volunteer military, has all but eliminated serious protest.

Ultimately, if America is unsuccessful in reining in MIC costs, it could result in a threat to national security, the loss of international prestige, as well as, possibly cause unmitigated hardship here at home, as defense spending takes away government services from the 99% and ultimately leads to an increase in taxation upon all Americans, the 100%. (By way of example, take a look at the financial situation of the so-called PIIGS in Europe… and ask yourself, are these nations in any kind of financial condition to fight a war on terror or handle any other sovereign threat?  The PIIG’s fiscal policy, and deficit spending, is a threat to their very own national security.)  Equally tragic, back in America, nation building exercises may leave the MIC winded and the public less likely to support the use of force in the future, when the U.S. may actually have very good reasons for going to war.

“Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be 

dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes … known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.… No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.”

— James Madison, Fourth President of the U.S.

There is some reason for optimism however. Not everyone who enters the White House is an opportunist or a poor war strategist. Look at George H.W. Bush and his management of the first Gulf War; this was a war that was fought with great precision, finite goals and objectives, and clearly big oil and the House of Saud were among the beneficiaries of that war, not to mention the Government of Kuwait. Arguably, the U.S. should have submitted a substantive portion of the bill for that war to the various governments in the Middle East and to commercial oil concerns operating in the region.

Better yet, observe President Obama and his deft and expert management of the overthrow of the Libyan dictator, Colonel Gaddafi. These are excellent examples of where the U.S. military was utilized for its intended use, as opposed to an unending nation building exercise that only served to enrich the private contractors of war, and the commercial interests that sweep in post-war – all at the expense of the American people and the men and women who serve. Are we naive enough to believe that these same commercial interests, in our present form of democracy, do not have a considerable say in how and when America goes to war? Do foreign governments and the MIC lobby the congress? Assuredly and big time!

To be sure, there are many reasons to go to war, and American leaders may in fact have the best of intentions and the highest of ideals ( humanitarian, the spread of democracy, and otherwise), but our leaders nor the American people should never lose sight of the fact that there are tremendous profits to be made in war, as well as, many interested parties and unintended consequences and expense.  

J.M.H. is a fan of President Obama’s foreign policy, and the world owes him a debt for his substantial contribution towards the Libyan dictators removal; and America owes the President another debt for finally extricating our service men and women from the Iraq war.

That said, it appears that we plan on colonizing Afghanistan for years to come, in yet another nation building exercise. Witness last Wednesday’s NY Times story, which quotes a U.S. general as stating that America may be in Afghanistan beyond 2014. How ironic that Afghanistan, under Americas watch, has been and remains the worlds foremost opium purveyor. Americans, fiscal conservatives, and liberals, who find endless war objectionable, or too damn corrupt and expensive, may find that Republican Presidential Candidate Ron Paul provides sharp and welcome contrast to mainstream political pandering to the MIC. Perhaps Mr. Paul can help drag the mainstream towards his line of thinking?

J.M.H. is grateful for the men and women who serve their country. And Americans, as responsible participants in our democracy, owe it to our armed forces to make sure that when our elected officials send these men and women into harms way – it truly is for the advancement and protection of the national interest, and not just another nation building exercise. These men and women would also be better served if the true costs of U.S. involvement in armed conflict were allocated to commercial entities and foreign governments, with vested economic and political interests, when and where possible.

After all, blood and nation building are a huge expense.

P.S. 

“The most powerful weapon on earth is the human soul on fire.” -Ferdinand Foch

Americans should not confuse a quick willingness to go to war with patriotism, or subservience to the MIC as a rational political agenda.  Ronald Reagan, who never started a hot war in his two terms in office, is model for current political leadership to emmulate, in this regard.

A very happy holidays!

Copyright JM Hamilton Publishing 2013