Dien Bien Phu & the Last Empire
by J.M. Hamilton (Originally Published 12-25-11)
“Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy.” –
French P.M. Jules Ferry
Lost
in the fog of war and the mists of time is a long forgotten battle. A battle
fought on the other side of the world, between the French and a proud and
indigenous people, who wanted nothing more than their freedom from colonial
rule. The U.S., at that time, pumped what would be considered an exceptional
amount of money into the French military. Fought in the decade following WWII,
and with the Korean War very much on the minds of U.S. policy makers, surely
the French could defeat this revolutionary tribe. But it was not meant to be,
the French decided to roll the dice within Indochina’s isolated hill country,
near the enemy’s Laotian supply line. The French opposition knew the importance
of this battle, as international negotiations were underway in Geneva over the
regions future. The French, who had brought with them into battle mobile
bordellos, were caught off guard when they found themselves surrounded by
captured artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns, strategically placed on
higher ground. The subsequent battle of Dien Bien Phu ended French colonial
rule in Southeast Asia, and became a rallying cry globally for nationalist
movements seeking independence from occupying western powers. The country was
subsequently divided in two at Geneva, and Ho Chi Minh was given a foothold in
North Vietnam and international legitimacy, with which to launch a civil war
that would eventually end in American defeat two decades later.
The
New York Times reported on 5-9-54 the following: “The fall of Dien Bien Phu
marks the end of an era. The ultimate military, political and psychological
reactions may either make or break the anti-Communist front in the Far East and
France as a great power… A lost battle has tipped the scales of history in the
past; Dien Bien Phu may prove, in future accountings, to be the balance point
in contemporary history.” - After Dien Bien Phu, What?
Could
the Iraq war be America’s Dien Bien Phu?
Before
answering that question, let’s take a look at the similarities and differences
between America’s wars in Iraq and Indochina. And then let’s examine the cost
allocation of war.
History
repeats. Both wars, Vietnam and Iraq, were started at a time when the American
public was hyper vigilant about a perceived and real menace in the world:
Communism and Radical Islam. In both wars, political authorization for U.S.
involvement was obtained under dubious and questionable circumstances: In
Vietnam it was the Gulf of Tonkin incident that provided a catalyst, and in
Iraq it was concern over weapons of mass destruction. In both wars the political
goals and objectives were nebulous over time, and finally denigrated into
“nation building;” and in both wars, America was either forced to leave the
battlefield or requested to leave… no longer wanted, and leaving under less
than auspicious circumstances. Time would also show that the twin threats of
Communism and Arab Radicalism would dissolve considerably with the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the rise of the Arab Spring/pro-democracy movements.
And
as Vietnam proved, and as pointed out by Alan Abelson in last weeks Barron’s,
Americans will not know the true cost of the Iraq war for many decades. The
Iraq war will more than likely exceed a trillion is net cost, but that doesn’t
begin to account for the tremendous forgone opportunity costs incurred by the
nation, when we consider that Iraq war debt could have been allocated to
helping Americans achieve a higher education, or if said funds were allocated
to paying down the national debt, or not expanding same. Even by today’s
standards, a trillion dollars is still real money. Nor does this begin to
factor in the additional economic burden placed upon ordinary Americans, and
returning soldiers, post war, when monetary policy inevitably swings towards
war debt monetization – resulting in inflation and lower living standards.
That
the real political achievement of the Iraq war was the permanent removal of
Saddam Hussein calls into question the efficacy of Executive Order 12333, which
supposedly forbids the assassination of foreign heads of state. The reality is
there are plenty of exemptions to Executive Order 12333, and so if we compare
the cost of the Iraq war to say, the cost of the mission to eliminate Osama bin
Laden, well there really is no comparison. What’s the nominal cost of a bullet
or a drone, versus the extraordinary cost of Iraq War…. all to remove one man?
To push the point a step further, compare the cost, in blood and treasure, to
remove Col. Gaddafi versus Saddam Hussein?
Separately,
“nation building” (code for we no longer know what the freak we are doing here,
so we have turned this mission into a philanthropic enterprise) was a failure
in Vietnam, and only time will tell if it will prove successful in Iraq. Recent
actions by the Iraqi prime minister, like issuing an arrest warrant for the
Iraqi Vice President and further consolidating his hold on power, already call
into question whether or not a nascent Iraqi democracy will flower and grow.
What nation building really has come to symbolize is a run up of conflict costs
and expenditures, and a financial “pig-out” by private contractors and
commercial interests within a war zone, all at U.S. tax payer expense.
Despite
many similarities, a key difference between both wars was the utilization of
conscription by U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam, versus an all volunteer
military fighting force in the Iraq War, and the resulting passive objection to
the Iraq war by U.S. society, versus the near public rebellion over the Vietnam
war. Some how it makes it more acceptable to some Americans if the poor and the
down trodden are voluntarily sacrificed upon the altar of war, instead of the
sons and daughters of the wealthy and the middle class, via the draft. And the
military industrial complex (MIC) knows this. Former Defense Secretary Robert
Gates warned of a separation in society between an elite warrior class and
ordinary Americans.
Also
of critical importance, we can see a tremendous disconnect in the way the costs
of war are passed onto society as whole, in lieu of armed conflict’s true
beneficiaries. J.M.H. argues that because of this, wars have a tendency to drag
on indefinitely. In other words if the true costs of the war were allocated
correctly, than wars would become more efficient, cost effective, produce swifter
results with less loss of human life, and pull out and withdrawal would become
more rapid. More thought might also be given to entering into war in the first
place.
So
who or what truly benefited then from the removal of Saddam Hussein, aside from
the Shia majority inside Iraq? Well as clearly alluded to by French Prime
Minister Jules Ferry, commercial interests clearly benefit from war without
end, colonization, and/or nation building. Big Oil was clearly chomping at the
bit to return to Iraq. And of course the U.S. military industrial complex
expanded and grew, significantly, over the last decade, more than doubling in
budgetary outlays. Not surprisingly banks benefit with the issuance of martial
debt and financing. The fact that the U.S. government spends more on defense
than the G-20 combined says it all.
As
with all wars, there are often unintended consequences. An unintended
beneficiary of Mr. Hussein’s removal was Iran; and Iran has been working to
obtain a foothold inside Iraq, with success, ever since the U.S. lead invasion.
America
has to figure out a way to be less subservient to what President Eisenhower
referred to in his farewell address to the nation as the military industrial
complex; failure to do so may mean that Iraq could become America’s Dien Bien
Phu. How then might America control the costs of war, and prevent taxpayer
money, sometimes with good intentions, from being wasted on nation building? If
the cost of Iraq war was amortized over the costs of the products and services
produced by the MIC, and passed onto foreign consumers (America being the
largest arms dealer on the planet), the price of a prolonged and protracted war
would become too great for the MIC to endure and would make MIC products and
services considerably less competitive. Likewise, if the price of the Iraq war
were presented as a cost of doing business to Big Oil or mining interests, they
would balk at the cost; and maybe the Iraq war truly would have ended when Mr.
George Bush landed on the deck of the aircraft carrier, USS Abraham Lincoln,
with the now infamous sign, “Mission Accomplished.” Thanks to the manner in
which American wars are presently billed, there is no financial incentive to
rein in the cost, since the U.S. has been living on a credit card economy for
decades, and the MIC, via its all volunteer military, has all but eliminated
serious protest.
Ultimately,
if America is unsuccessful in reining in MIC costs, it could result in a threat
to national security, the loss of international prestige, as well as, possibly
cause unmitigated hardship here at home, as defense spending takes away
government services from the 99% and ultimately leads to an increase in
taxation upon all Americans, the 100%. (By way of example, take a look at the
financial situation of the so-called PIIGS in Europe… and ask yourself, are
these nations in any kind of financial condition to fight a war on terror or
handle any other sovereign threat? The PIIG’s fiscal policy, and deficit
spending, is a threat to their very own national security.) Equally
tragic, back in America, nation building exercises may leave the MIC winded and
the public less likely to support the use of force in the future, when the U.S.
may actually have very good reasons for going to war.
“Of all the enemies to public liberty war is,
perhaps, the most to be
dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ
of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes
… known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.… No
nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.”
— James Madison, Fourth President of the U.S.
There
is some reason for optimism however. Not everyone who enters the White House is
an opportunist or a poor war strategist. Look at George H.W. Bush and his
management of the first Gulf War; this was a war that was fought with great
precision, finite goals and objectives, and clearly big oil and the House of
Saud were among the beneficiaries of that war, not to mention the Government of
Kuwait. Arguably, the U.S. should have submitted a substantive portion of the
bill for that war to the various governments in the Middle East and to
commercial oil concerns operating in the region.
Better
yet, observe President Obama and his deft and expert management of the
overthrow of the Libyan dictator, Colonel Gaddafi. These are excellent examples
of where the U.S. military was utilized for its intended use, as opposed to an
unending nation building exercise that only served to enrich the private
contractors of war, and the commercial interests that sweep in post-war – all
at the expense of the American people and the men and women who serve. Are we
naive enough to believe that these same commercial interests, in our present
form of democracy, do not have a considerable say in how and when America goes
to war? Do foreign governments and the MIC lobby the congress? Assuredly and
big time!
To
be sure, there are many reasons to go to war, and American leaders may in fact
have the best of intentions and the highest of ideals ( humanitarian, the
spread of democracy, and otherwise), but our leaders nor the American people
should never lose sight of the fact that there are tremendous profits to be made
in war, as well as, many interested parties and unintended consequences and
expense.
J.M.H.
is a fan of President Obama’s foreign policy, and the world owes him a debt for
his substantial contribution towards the Libyan dictators removal; and America owes
the President another debt for finally extricating our service men and women
from the Iraq war.
That
said, it appears that we plan on colonizing Afghanistan for years to come, in
yet another nation building exercise. Witness last Wednesday’s NY Times story,
which quotes a U.S. general as stating that America may be in Afghanistan
beyond 2014. How ironic that Afghanistan, under Americas watch, has been and
remains the worlds foremost opium purveyor. Americans, fiscal conservatives,
and liberals, who find endless war objectionable, or too damn corrupt and
expensive, may find that Republican Presidential Candidate Ron Paul provides
sharp and welcome contrast to mainstream political pandering to the MIC.
Perhaps Mr. Paul can help drag the mainstream towards his line of thinking?
J.M.H.
is grateful for the men and women who serve their country. And Americans, as
responsible participants in our democracy, owe it to our armed forces to make
sure that when our elected officials send these men and women into harms way –
it truly is for the advancement and protection of the national interest, and
not just another nation building exercise. These men and women would also be
better served if the true costs of U.S. involvement in armed conflict were
allocated to commercial entities and foreign governments, with vested economic
and political interests, when and where possible.
After
all, blood and nation building are a huge expense.
P.S.
“The most powerful weapon on earth is the
human soul on fire.” -Ferdinand Foch
Americans should not confuse a quick willingness to go to war with patriotism, or subservience to the MIC as a rational political agenda. Ronald Reagan, who never started a hot war in his two terms in office, is model for current political leadership to emmulate, in this regard.
Americans should not confuse a quick willingness to go to war with patriotism, or subservience to the MIC as a rational political agenda. Ronald Reagan, who never started a hot war in his two terms in office, is model for current political leadership to emmulate, in this regard.
A very happy holidays!
Copyright JM Hamilton Publishing 2013
